The court, in a ruling delivered Wednesday, October 14, 2026, held that the failure to endorse the writ of summons with sufficient particulars of the alleged defamatory publication, as required by the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47), rendered the action defective.

It consequently set aside the writ of summons and statement of claim filed on August 24, 2026.

The court made no order as to costs.

In its ruling, the court considered whether the particulars of the alleged defamatory publication contained in the statement of claim could cure the omission in the writ of summons.

It examined the Supreme Court’s decision in Owusu-Domena v Amoah, in which the court held that particulars contained in a statement of claim could cure a defective endorsement on a writ where the defendant had not raised an objection and had participated fully in the proceedings.

However, the court distinguished the circumstances of the present case from that decision.

It explained that the applicant had entered a conditional appearance at the outset of the proceedings and immediately followed it with the application challenging the writ.

The court, therefore, disagreed with the plaintiff’s position that the particulars contained in the statement of claim could cure the defect.

The court held that specific legal remedies required compliance with the particular procedural rules governing them, adding that general provisions could not always be applied to actions subject to special requirements.

It cited Order 57 of C.I. 47, which governs defamation actions, and referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in consolidated cases involving Alex Onuma and others against Newmont.

Order 57, rule 2 requires a writ in an action for libel to be endorsed with sufficient particulars of the allegation to enable the publication complained of to be identified.

Rule 3(1) also requires particulars of the facts and matters relied upon where a plaintiff alleges that words were used in a defamatory sense other than their ordinary meaning.

The court concluded that the failure to endorse the writ with sufficient particulars of the alleged defamatory publication rendered the action defective.

The court also declined to take into consideration an amended process filed in the course of the proceedings.

Citing Ahin Akwa II v Okai Jah III, it held that an amendment could not be sought or granted for the purpose of defeating an objection to a process already pending before the court.

The court accordingly set aside the writ of summons and statement of claim filed on August 24, 2026, and made no order as to costs.